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 Malpractice reforms could help curb health care spending and 
promote safety, but PPACA only offers small steps. 
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Political battles over malpractice 
reform have recurred for 35 years, 
starting at the state level. Many states 
have enacted caps on awards and 
other tort reforms amid liability 
insurance crises proclaimed in the 
mid-1970s, mid-1980s, and early 
2000s. Since the mid-1990s, 
Republicans have unsuccessfully 
sought similar malpractice limits at 
the federal level. Sharp run-ups in 
claims rates preceded the first two 
crises; the last seemed more driven by 
increases in awards and other costs, 
along with insurance market 
developments. Defensive medicine 
arose separately as a national policy 
issue in the late 1960s. At the time, 
medical liability was expanding from 
the very low level of the 1950s 
because of shifts in both tort doctrines 
and social culture. 
The debates about problems and 
reforms are acrimonious, and 
arguments have become routinized. 
Conventional tort reform is a zero-
sum game, much as lawsuits are—
every gain for one side is a loss for the 
other. Meanwhile, neither patients nor 
caregivers are well served by the 
traditional liability regime.
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The liability provisions of the Patient 
Protection and Affordability Act 
(PPACA)
2
 did nothing to change this 
political dynamic or the underlying 
problems. The number of preventable 
injuries remains high, almost entirely 
compensated by health insurance 
rather than liability insurance. Some 
defensiveness persists, encouraging 
overutilization and hampering cost 
containment and many forms of safety 
promotion. Accountability for 
underperforming practitioners remains 
elusive, possibly to be improved by 
other parts of health reform. And 
liability processes continue to 
consume substantial time and 
resources to deliver compensation to a 
very small share of injured people. 
This brief describes the relevant 
provisions of PPACA and lays out 
some alternative approaches to 
problems of medical injury and 
liability. 
PPACA’s Two Small 
Liability-Related 
Provisions 
President Barack Obama, as recently 
as mid-2009, signaled willingness to 
trade some liability changes for 
medical providers‘ support of health 
reform.
3
 However, the partisan divide 
that emerged on health reform did not 
support such compromise. As enacted, 
PPACA contained only two, quite 
limited malpractice provisions. 
Section 10607 authorized malpractice 
demonstrations by states, and section 
10608 extended federal malpractice 
protections to free clinics‘ nonmedical 
personnel. 
The demonstration authority comes 
with many conditions that are much 
more limiting than the demonstrations 
grants already implemented by the 
Obama administration.
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 Under 
PPACA, only states may be funded; 
funding levels are too low to backstop 
alternative compensation systems; 
even those funds are unappropriated; 
and any patient in a demonstration 
can, at any time, bring a conventional 
tort claim instead. The free-clinic 
provision extends the scope of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
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The act had previously been modified 
to cover health professionals‘ 
volunteered services at free clinics, as 
well as care at federally qualified 
community health centers, as though 
the caregivers were federal 
employees, such as Veterans 
Administration physicians. The FTCA 
does not alter state rules of tort law, 
which govern any claims made; but 
claims resolution follows federal 
processes, any trials occur in federal 
courts, and payouts come from federal 
funds. 
The Potential for Savings 
from Changes in Liability 
Two key issues are what savings 
would accrue from reducing 
defensiveness and whether less fearful 
providers might cause more harm to 
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patients. Taking the latter issue first, 
defensive medicine means activities 
undertaken or forgone more for legal 
defense than for patient benefit, so 
omitting defensive services almost by 
definition would not harm patients. 
Defenders of liability assert that any 
limit on tort liability reduces safety. 
This assertion sounds plausible but is 
not supported by what limited 
evidence exists, and health reform 
offers other platforms for promoting 
quality and safety. 
How large might savings be? 
Probably about a half to a full 
percentage point of health spending, 
including cuts in defensive services as 
well as in malpractice premiums and 
litigation costs.
6
 The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has estimated a 
0.5 percent cut in spending from 
conventional tort reform.
7
 Savings 
could likely be larger—and more 
reliably achievable—if legal reform 
were combined with other incentives 
or controls to reduce overutilization of 
low-value services. Only part of the 
savings would occur within federal 
programs, and further changes might 
be needed to ensure savings accrued 
to public and prior payers rather than 
to providers. 
The PPACA implementation period 
offers another opportunity to combine 
conventional or unconventional 
liability reforms with other 
approaches to bending the cost curve 
down and the safety-quality curve up. 
What Liability and Safety 
Reforms Have Promise, 
and Do They Qualify for 
Demonstration Grants?8 
Early disclosure with compensation 
seems to have the broadest appeal 
among reforms, in great measure 
because it requires no change in law 
and combines claims resolution with 
the promise of improved patient 
safety. The idea is to disclose adverse 
events promptly to patients, offering 
reasonable compensation where 
mistakes have occurred. The approach 
seeks to reduce patients‘ desire to 
litigate and increase information for 
safety improvement. A few pioneering 
VA and academic medical centers 
have taken this approach and report 
being able to resolve their cases much 
faster and at lower cost than before. 
Demonstrations are desirable to 
improve understanding of such 
impacts and to show whether 
providers without unified 
management of hospital and physician 
care can replicate this model. The 
administration‘s grant program is 
funding such demonstrations,
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 but 
they do not qualify for PPACA 
support. 
The safe harbor approach seemed to 
have been endorsed by President 
Obama but never received serious 
legislative attention. A safe harbor 
rewards adherence to evidence-based 
guidelines by making it a presumptive 
defense to a claim that care was 
negligent because some different or 
additional service did not occur. 
Guidelines could start with any branch 
of care seen as high in defensiveness 
or low in safety. Implementation 
challenges are substantial, as 
individual circumstances will lead to 
exceptions. Because this approach 
would require legislative changes to 
liability rules, it does not qualify for 
PPACA demonstration grants. 
Aggregate enforcement through 
payment or participation rules may be 
a more reliable way to implement 
guidelines, apart from case-by-case 
use as a malpractice defense. 
Making more even-handed changes 
to tort rules or processes is another 
promising idea. For example, flat caps 
on awards are arguably inequitable, 
but the lack of any consistent 
standards in traditional law leads to 
both horizontal and vertical inequities 
in awards. Flat caps could be replaced 
with actuarially equivalent sliding 
scales for pain and suffering. These 
could still improve the predictability 
of awards and avoid outlandish 
verdicts, thus reducing defensiveness; 
and they would also improve the 
consistency and proportionality of 
payouts to injured patients. Because 
they change legal rules, such 
arrangements would not qualify as 
demonstrations. 
Administrative compensation in lieu 
of tort is a longstanding proposal for 
comprehensive liability reform that 
has recently been rebranded as ―health 
courts.‖ Like workers‘ compensation 
or vaccine compensation funds, such 
approaches would replace the 
traditional tort system with insurance 
coverage designed to pay for more 
injuries, faster, cheaper, and more 
consistently. By emphasizing neutral 
medical expertise and avoiding 
courtroom battles of experts, the 
approach is meant to make 
practitioners less defensive. Given its 
limited precedents in the United 
States, demonstrations are needed, but 
full replacements of the conventional 
legal system seem ineligible for 
demonstration funding under PPACA 
or the administration‘s grant program.  
Improving future compensation and 
care for permanent severe injuries is 
little discussed as a liability reform 
but is a worthy goal. It would address 
the other reason besides allowances 
for pain and suffering that raise 
liability awards above the limits of 
physicians‘ liability coverage and 
make them fearful of bankruptcy. 
Proposals have been made, but not 
implemented, for more efficient 
coordination and management of 
ongoing care across payers. 
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Demonstration support is appropriate 
because both market and social 
program incentives for such 
management are weak. Again, 
demonstration funding appears 
unlikely under the current rules. 
More enterprise responsibility in 
health care would make health care 
more like nonhealth sectors of the 
economy. There, individual 
professionals are rarely sued; their 
employers are responsible and act to 
reduce defensiveness and improve 
safety. Health reform offers ways to 
expand such approaches, notably 
through accountable care 
organizations. ACOs remain largely 
conceptual, but demonstrations might 
be feasible in due course. This 
approach does not fit the PPACA 
criteria. 
What Other Changes Might 
Be Considered Going 
Forward? 
Two points deserve mention here. 
First, given the restrictiveness of the 
enacted PPACA framework for 
demonstrations, the administration‘s 
grants process at the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 
seems preferable for stimulating 
innovative and useful proposals. Its 
procurement has already engendered 
much interest in planning and 
demonstrating reforms. As yet, the 
agency lacks ongoing funds to support 
initiatives whose planning shows the 
most promise. Shifting any available 
PPACA demonstration funding to this 
preexisting process would enable 
productive follow-through on the 
administration‘s initial investments 
and perhaps also allow additional 
start-ups. 
Second, the recent health reform 
debates failed to alter the hardened 
political postures on liability reform. 
The Democrats who had to pass 
PPACA without bipartisan support 
continued to see liability reform as a 
takeaway from injured patients and a 
giveaway to doctors—the familiar 
zero-sum game. Liability reforms 
would seem more acceptable if they 
achieved value not only for doctors 
but also for patients, by strengthening 
health reform. Thus, some limits on 
tort liability could help fund the 
abolition of health coverage limits. 
Health insurance covers more injury 
costs and does more to promote health 
than any liability coverage can. It also 
provides a platform for improving 
patient safety. PPACA faces a large 
challenge in maintaining affordability 
going forward, and trading liability 
changes for other changes could help.  
The free-clinic liability provision 
provides a good example of such a 
trade-off. Potential defendants got free 
liability coverage and an altered tort 
process with features appealing to 
defendants, including no jury trials, no 
punitive awards, and limits on 
attorneys‘ fees. Why? Because, to get 
these benefits, they have to give back 
something of value—free care for 
largely disadvantaged patients. 
The same principle could be applied 
elsewhere. For example, the FTCA 
could be extended to promote full 
participation in Medicaid or to reduce 
resistance to evidence-based 
medicine, case management, or other 
health insurance initiatives that reduce 
cost or enhance value. It is more 
challenging to seek out productive 
interactions between liability and 
health reform than to rehash familiar 
positions for or against tort reforms. 
But seeking out such synergies has the 
potential to be much more helpful to 
all patients and premium payers. 
Summary 
Neither patients nor caregivers are 
well served by the traditional regime 
of medical liability. Yet debates about 
liability reform have become 
nonproductive battles between pro-
defendant and pro-plaintiff forces. 
Health reform did nothing to alter that 
political dynamic, nor the underlying 
problems of preventable injury and 
defensive medicine. Patients as a 
whole could benefit if conventional 
tort limits were traded for better-value 
care as health reform is implemented 
or if broader reforms of liability could 
be demonstrated successful. The pre-
existing demonstration mechanisms of 
the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality better serve this purpose 
than do PPACA‘s very limited 
provisions on demonstrations. 
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